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APPLICABILITY OF LEX LOCI CONTRACTUS TO IMPOSE PARTNERSHIP
LIABILITY ON STOCKHOLDERS OF AN UNREGISTERED
FOREIGN CORPORATION.
The broad assertion of text-writers, frequently made, that the
individual liability for corporate debts is to be determined exclu-
sively by the law of the state of incorporation,' does not appear
to be fully justified by an adequate analysis of the problem
involved or a more complete survey of the authorities relating
thereto.2  The decision reached in a recent Tenessee case,
Cunnyngham v. Shelby,3 is directly in point The defendants
'Westlake, Priv. Int. Law (5th ed., 1912) pp. 407-408; Beale, Foreign
Corporations, sec. 442; but see Clark, Corporations (ed. Wormser, 1916)
pp. 736-738.
'Prof. Wesley N. Hohfeld, The Individual Liability of Stockholders
and the Conflict of Laws (igio) io COL. L. REV. 294, n. 24.
' (1916) 188 S. W. (Tenn.) i47.
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were stockholders in a Delaware corporation which had carried
on business in Tennessee without having attempted to comply
with the statutory requirements as to foreign corporations. The
plaintiffs, who had been employed by the corporation, sought to
hold the stockholders liable as partners. The courts of Tennessee
sustained this claim.
At the outset of an analysis of the problem involved, it is
important to note that we are-not now concerned with the internal
affairs of the foreign corporation, or with the rights, privileges,
powers and immunities of the stockholders in relation "to the
corporation." When we remove the fiction or veil of "corporate
entity," such relations prove to be in reality the jural relations of
the stockholders inter se. The internal organization and gov-
ernment of foreign corporations are, of course, to be regulated
according to the law of the place of incorporation. 4 It would
seem equally clear that the extent and nature of the stockholders'
jural relations to one another should be determined by the same
law; that is, the law under which the corporate agreement was
made and the conditions of membership fixed.5
The obligations and liabilities of stockholders "to the cor-
poration," i. e., inter se, to pay the amount of an assessment,
or to pay their ratable share of a corporate debt under an indi-
vidual liability to contribution in favor of other stockholders
'Miles v. Woodward (1896) u15 Cal. 3o8, 31i; see Williams v. Gaylord
(1go2) x86 U. S. i57, 65, affirming s. c. (1goo) io2 Fed. 372, 375;
London, etc., Bank v. Aronstein (1902) 117 Fed. 6oi, 6og.
'Nashua Savings Bank v. Anglo-American, etc., Co. (19o3) I89 U. S.
22i; Allen v. Fairbanks (891) 45 Fed. 445; Morris v. Glen (1888) 87
Ala. 628; Lewisohn v. Stoddard (i9o6) 78 Conn. 575. These cases all
relate to internal matters or to the obligations and liabilities of the
stockholders "to the corporation"; but they are sometimes erroneously
cited for the (broad) proposition that the law of the place of incorpora-
tion determines the existence (or non-existence), nature, and extent of
stockholders' individual obligations to corporation creditors.
Compare Morawetz, Priv. Corp. (2d ed.) VoL II, sec. 967: "The word
'charter' is here used to signify the agreement between the shareholders
of the corporation, whether this agreement be in a special act of the
legislature, or in articles of association, or in either of these taken in
connection with certain general laws of the state. . . The laws of the
state where the corporation was formed by the agreement of the corpora-
tors are regarded only so far as they determine the scope and validity
of this agreement itself. The same rule would apply to a general or
limited partnership formed by agreement in one state for the purpose of
carrying on business in other states."
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are fundamentally different from direct obligations and liabilities
to corporation creditors, whether the obligation and liabilities be
corporate so-called (i. e., "quasi-joint") 6 or individual (several).
Courts and text-writers have not infrequently overlooked these
distinctions. The problem in all cases similar to Cunnyngham
v. Shelby, the Tennessee case under review, is: According to
what rule of law should be determined the stockholders' direct
individual obligations and liabilities to corporation creditors?
7
The crucial question here is not an internal one." The common-
law rule of partnership liability declared by the Tennessee court
to be applicable to the stockholders in an unregistered foreign
corporation is analogous to California's statutory rule of pro-
portional individual liability-the latter applying equally to all
corporations actually doing business there. Cases decided under
such a statute, therefore, are, so far as the fundamental problem
of the conflict of laws is cocerned, persuasive and important
precedents. With a single exception, Risdon Iron and Locomo-
tive Works v. Furness,9 the decisions under such statutes hold the
stockholders individually liable?0
It is well settled as a general common-law principle that if the
law of the place of incorporation imposes no, direct individual
' For a discussion of the nature of stockholders' corporate (or "quasi-
joint") obligations, commonly designated the obligations "of the corpora-
tion," see Prof. Wesley N. Hohfeld, Nature of Stockholders' Individual
Liability for Corporation Debts (i9o9) 9 CoL. L. REv. 285, 301-308.
'For the conflicting rules, see (igog) 9 COL. L. REv. 499-505.
a See note 6.
'[I9o5] 2 K. B. 304; affirmed [i9o6] i K. B. 49; criticised (I91O) io
COL. L. Rav. 283; (igo) io CoL.. L. REy. 520.
"Pinney v. Nelson (i9oi) 183 U. S. 144. A corporation was formed
in Colorado with only a limited liability. By the express terms of the
charter, the corporation could do business in California. Business was
done in that state; and the court held that the stockholder became bound
by the laws of the state -specifically -mentioned in the charter; that he
would be held individually liable for his proportionate share of the debts
of the corporation according to the California statute.
Peck v. Noee (19o8) 154 Cal. 351, reached a similar result involving a
California stockholder in a Nevada corporation doing business in
California.
Thomas v. Wenthworth Hotel Co. (91o) 158 Cal. 275, sustained the
same proposition for an Arizona corporation.
Thomas v. Matthiessen (1914) 232 U. S. 221. In this case the corpora-
tion by its articles was authorized to do business in California as well
as elsewhere, and the defendant stockholder, a citizen and resident of
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obligation whatever, the lex loci contractus, even if deemed con-
trolling in the first instance, will in fact impose on the stock-
holders of a foreign or extra-state corporation neither partnership
obligations nor any other individual obligations, but on the con-
trary merely "corporate" or "quasi-joint" obligations." This
represents what the common law generally does; but even the
common law may, whenever the adoption of the law of the place
of incorporation be repugnant to its policy or prejudicial to its
interests, depart from the general rule of "comity" and hold the
stockholders to unlimited partnership obligations. This, it is sub-
mitted, is the chief, if not the only, ratio decidendi of a few
cases.' 2
New York, was held liable for his proportionate share of the corporation
debts; the action having been brought in the U. S. District Court of New
York.
The most recent case decided under this statute is Provident Gold
Mining Co. v. Haynes (i9i6) i59 Pac. (Cal.) 155. See a comment in(x916) 26 YALE LAW JouRN.L, 143. This case marks a further step, for no
specific provision was made for the corporation to do business in Cali-
fornia as was made for the four previous cases; nevertheless, a general
authorization to do business in the state was given, the corporation being
organized to do business in Arizona, or "in any other state or territory
as the board of directors may from time to time deem necessary and
expedient."
The general question raised by the California statute is becoming of
increasing importance. Two cases involving statutes fundamentally similar
are: Leyner Engineering Works v. Kempner (i9O8) 163 Fed. 6o5, decided
under a Colorado statute providing for individual liability of stockholders
of a foreign corporation because of failure to file a copy of articles of
incorporation, etc., and Chesley v. Soo Lignite Coal Co. (igog) 121 N. W.(N. D.) 73, decided under a similar state of facts.
'See Bateman v. Service (1881) L. R. 5 App. Cas. 386, 389, per Sir
Richard Couch: "But it was contended that the Legislature of Western
Australia . . . . enacted that unless a foreign corporation, carrying
on business in Western Australia, complied with this Ordinance and was
registered according to its provisions, its individual members should be
liable to be sued for its debts. It was stated, and properly, that the real
question in the case was whether the Western Australian Legislature so
enacted.
"In considering that question we may first look at the principle which
is laid down by Story. . . . 'In the silence of any positive rule affirm-
ing or denying or restraining the operation of foreign laws, Courts ofjustice presume the tacit adoption of them by their own government,
unless they are repugnant to its policy or prejudicial to its interests."'
(1910) 1o COL. L. REV. 520, 536; Cleaton v. Emery (892) 49 Mo.
App. 345 (Corporation chartered in Colorado intending to do business
exclusively, or almost exclusively, in Missouri). Gill, J.: "The state
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It has been held in some cases that where the corporate
existence is effected in another state purely for the purpose of
defeating personal liability, the foreign incorporation will be
disregarded, so far as individual liability is concerned, in a state
where business is transacted.13
Somewhat related to this class of cases are those in which a
foreign corporation has failed to register, or file its articles,
according to state registration statutes, although otherwise not
violating the laws or policy of the state in which business is
transacted. At least some authorities are inferentially inclined
against the principal case, which, falls within the class last men-
tioned, holding, under various registration statutes and sets of
facts, that the stockholders are not liable as partners on contracts
executed in the name of the corporation. 1' A statute might
impose such a liability.15
In Morton v. Haff' 6 an agent who had actually entered into
contract for a corporation having, because of failure to file copy
of articles, etc., no power to transact business within the state
was held personally liable on the ground that the corporation
having no power could delegate none to the defendant. In
Cunnyngham v. Shelby, the stockholder was held liable not
as an agent but as a principal. This case, decided apart from
of Colorado attempted here by this incorporation to create and send out
to another state this organized entity, not to do business within its own
realm, but to carry on such business altogether in another state. . .
To concede its validity and recognize its existence is to admit authority
in another state to direct this commonwealth: in short to yield to Colo-
rado the partial exercise of our state's sovereignty." Empire Mills v.
Olston Grocery Co. (i891) 15 S. W. (Tex.) oo; Taylor v. Branham
(1898) 35 Fla. 297; cf. Merrick v. Brainard (i86o) 38 Barb. (N. Y.) 574
(This case was reversed in 34 N. Y. 2o8, not on the ground that there
was any absence of "power" on part of the lex loci delicti, but on grounds
of the~rules of "comity," etc.).
'Davidson v. Hobson (1894) 59 Mo. App. 130; see also Hill -v. Beach
(i858) 12 N. J. Eq. 31; Montgomery v. Forbes (1889) 148 Mass. 249;
Cleaton v. Emery (1892) 49 Mo. App. 345.
"'See Nat'l Bank v. Spot Cash Coal Co. (I91z) 98 Ark. 59; opinion of
Kirby, J. in Tribble v. Halbert (1gio) 143 Mo. App. 524.
"Cf. Va. Code, sec. iio5: "The officers, agents, and employees of any
such corporation doing business in this state without a license shall be per-
sonally liable to the state for any fines imposed on it, and to any resident
of the state having a claim against such a corporation." See also cases
cited in note io, last paragraph.
' (i89o) 88 Tenn. 427; see also Raff v. Isham (1912) 235 Pa. St. 347;
Lasher v. Stinson (1892) 145 Pa. St. 30.
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any statute imposing partnership liability, extends the stock-
holders' obligations and liabilities a step farther than the agency
cases. However, so far as the doctrines of the conflicts of laws
are concerned, the principal case is not inconsistent with the prin-
ciples developed in the evolution of the law governing stock-
holders' liabilities, inasmuch as the Tennessee court, the lex loci
contractus and the lex fori being identical, pursued its own policy
and applied its own fundamental common-law rules, regardless
of any rules of "comity" and of the laws of Delaware.
G. S., JR.
TORT ARISING FROM ATTEMPTED FULFILMENT OF CONTRACT.
A recent Minnesota decision presents an interesting question
in the tort liability assumed by one who undertakes an employ-
ment. The defendant detective agency, being employed to obtain
information concerning the conduct of the plaintiff's wife, negli-
gently shadowed another woman, and falsely reported to the
plaintiff that his wife's conduct was immoral. The plaintiff in
reliance thereon charged his wife with such misconduct, where-
upon she left him definitely. The plaintiff now seeks to recover
damages for the alienation of his wife's affections resulting from
such negligence, expressly waiving recovery of the sum paid for
services. The court decided that, in order to recover from a third
party for alienating the affections of a spouse, the plaintiff must
show active and intentional conduct of defendant in causing
such estrangement, and that the modified complaint here stated
no cause of action.
Without question the proposition on which the court grounds
the dismissal of the suit is correct.2 Mere negligence is not
sufficient to give an action for the common-law tort of alienation
of a wife's affections. Yet it is open to question whether the
complaint does not state a good cause of action for negligent
misfeasance, into which such alienation would enter as a damage
element. The plaintiff, says the court, "grounds his action
wholly upon the claim that defendant was negligent in the per-
formance of duties which plaintiff employed it to perform."
Whether a duty be undertaken gratuitously or for hire, one,
1 Lilligren v. Burns International Detective Agency (ii6) i6o N. W.
(Minn.) 203.
2 See Tasker v. Stanley (i8g1) 153 Mass. 148, and cases cited.
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undertaking, renders himself liable in case of misfeasance to an
action on the case.3 This action is distinct from* that on the
contract proper, if there be such: it will not lie for failure to
begin performance at all4 but will for misdoing, either by irre-
vocable completion in a wrong fashion,5 or by failure to complete
an act once undertaken6 ; it may lie where a contract action could
not be maintained, as where in England a servant, carried by
a common carrier on a contract with his master, sues in his
own name to recover for damage to his baggage7 ; it is founded
on the general duty of every man to use due care to do whatever
he may begin in such manner as not to injure his neighbor. The
test seems to be, whether, disregarding the contract, there would
still be a legal duty on the defendant." In the principal case we
have that relation between plaintiff and defendant which has been
called an undertaking: a relation arising out of a voluntary act
by one whereby he undertakes a duty to another not dependent,
as is a contract, on a promise supported by consideration.9 Here
the voluntary act was the investigation and report to plaintiff of
the supposed conduct of his wife. The defendant was liable for
his negligence in not employing such skill as he had,'0 or even,
it would seem, such skill as he held himself out to have." Nor
are the fact and amount of consideration of importance, except
as evidencing the duty to employ that skill.'2
This being a special action on the case, special damage must
be proved"L-in this case of alienation of the wife's affections.
Inasmuch as the plaintiff's own voluntary act of accusation inter-
vened before the damage was done, the question arises whether
it was not remote or avoidable. The true test would seem to be
whether the act of the intervening agency was such as was to
be expected to happen on the defendant's act: if it was so to be
'Coggs v. Bernard (703) 2 Ld. Raym. gog.
'Elsee v. Gatward (1793) 5 T. R. 143; Courtenay v. Earle (185o) IO
C. B. 73.
'Elsee v. Gatward, supra; Brown vt Roorman (1844) II Cl. and F. i.
'Bagaglio v. Paolino (1913) 35 P- I. 171.
"Marshall v. York, Newcastle and Beri4ck Ry. Co. (1851) 11 C. B. 655;
Kelly v. Metrop. Ry. Co. [1895] 1 Q. B. 944.
'Turner v. Stallibrass [i8983 i Q. B. 56.
See (18gi) 5 HAIv. L. Rav. 222.
See Shiells v. Blackbourne (1789) i H. BI. I58.
"Cf. Walker v. Goodman (852) 21 Ala. 647.
Coggs v. Bernard, supra.
"Cf. Harrow School v. Alderton (i8oo) 2 Bos. & P. 86.
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expected, the result is not a remote consequence. In the case
of a human agency the result will generally be of a sort not to be
expected. 14 Yet, whereas the loss of credit, for instance, inci-
dent to an injury to a merchant's stock in trade, is too remote
for recovery, 15 similar loss of credit following a blow at a mer-
chant's credit has been held a proximate damage.'8 It is sub-
mitted that the blow here directed at plaintiff's family life was
thus direct: the most natural, and as shown by the event, the
intended purpose of the information in question was the revela-
tion of it to the plaintiff's wife, or the use of it in some other
way, as in a divorce court, to the dissolution of the plaintiff's
household. Such a dissolution followed from the use of the false
information. In concentrating their attention on the supposed
tort action for alienation of affections, then, the court may well
have overlooked the true, and valid, theory of the plaintiff's
complaint.
K. N. L.
THE RIGHT OF A PAYEE OF A STOLEN CERTIFIED CHECK WHO
HAS GIVEN VALUE FOR IT.
An interesting question involving an interpretation of the
N. I. L. was recently answered by the New York Supreme
Court in a decision holding that a payee who received a check
from one who stole it from the drawer's agent and who, pre-
tending to be such agent, obtained value to the amount of the
check, was not a holder in due course under section 91 and hence
could not recover on the instrument.'
The facts of the case show that a stock brokerage firm drew
its check on the defendant bank payable to the order of the
plaintiff trust company. The check was handed to a clerk who
was instructed to have it certified and to deliver it to the payee
in payment for revenue stamps. Immediately after the check
was certified, it was either stolen or erroneously handed to some
party other than the clerk by the bank officer. This party, repre-
senting himself as a messenger from the drawer firm, delivered
the check to the plaintiff-payee, and received the amount in
' Sedgwick, Damages (8th ed.) Vol. I, p. 186.
"
5Lowenstein v. Monroe (188o) 55 Ia. 82.
"Larios v. Bonan (1873) L. R. 5 P. C. 346.
'Empire Trust Company v. Manhattan Co. (1917) 162 N. Y. S. (App.
Div.) 629.
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revenue stamps. It further appeared that the party who pre-
sented the check to the plaintiff produced a necessary requisition,
on which was forged the signature of the drawer of the check.
In determining that the plaintiff trust company could not recover
against the certifying bank, the court decided that the plaintiff-
payee was not a holder in due course, but, on the contrary, was
an immediate party both to the check and the transaction within
the meaning of section 352 of the N. I. L.
Prior to the adoption of the N. I. L., many cases held that an
instrument in" the form of a negotiable promissory note, which
had never been delivered by the alleged maker, had no legal
existence as a promissory note; and the party sought to be
charged upon it might always, unless estopped by his negligence,
defend successfully against it, without regard to the time when,
or the circumstances under which, it was acquired by the holder.8
Other courts, however, recognized the necessity of sustaining the
circulation and credit of negotiable paper and held that delivery
was not essential to the validity of an instrument in the hands
of a holder in due course.
4
Whatever conflict of authority or uncertainty may have existed
before the enactment of the N. I. L. has been entirely eliminated
by the clear and decisive language of section 35, 5 which provides,
in part: "Where the instrument is in the hands of a holder in
due course, a valid delivery thereof by all parties prior to him so
as to make them liable to him is conclusively presumed." As
2The N. I. L., Art. III, sec. 35, provides that: "Every contract on a
negotiable instrument is incomplete and revocable until delivery of the
instrument for the purpose of giving effect thereto. As between imme-
diate parties, and as regards a remote party other than a holder in due
course, the delivery, in order to be effectual, must be made either by or
under the authority of the party making, drawing, accepting or indorsing,
as the case may be; and in such case the delivery may be shown to have
been conditional, or for a special purpose only, and not for the purpose
of transferring the property in the instrument. But where the instru-
ment is in the hands of a holder in due course, a valid delivery thereof
by all parties prior to him so as to make them liable to him is conclusively
presumed. And where the instrument is no longer in the possession
of a party whose signature appears thereon, a valid and intentional
delivery by him is presumed until the contrary is proved."
'Burson v. Huntington (1870) 21 Mich. 415; Cline v. Guthrie (1873)
42 Ind. 227; Roberts v. McGrath (1875) 38 Wis. 52.
'Worshan v. State (igop) 56 Tex. Crim. 253; Kinyon v. Wohiford




the instrument in the principal case was never delivered by the
drawer, it necessarily rests upon the plaintiff to bring himself
within the phrase "holder in due course," in order to maintain
his action.
There is some conflict in the decisions as to whether a payee
may be a holder in due course under the N. I. L. It has been held
in Alabama," Massachusetts, 7 and New York,8 that he may,
while in Iowa," Missouri,10 Oregon," and Washington, -2 a con-
trary conclusion has been reached. In New York, however, it
seems that the payee of a negotiable instrument may claim the
prerogatives of a holder in due course under section 91 of the
N. I. L. The court in the principal case, however, waived this
point and held that even if this was the correct interpretation of
the statute, the plaintiff would not be considered a holder in due
course in this case.
The N. I. L.13 defines a holder in due course as a holder who
has taken the instrument under the following conditions: (i)
that it is complete and regular on its face; (2) that he became
the holder of it before it was overdue, and without notice that
it had been previously dishonored, if such was the fact; (3) that
he took it in good faith and for value; and (4) that at the time
it was negotiated to him he had no notice of any infirmity in the
instrument or defect in the title from the person negotiating it.
The following section 4 expressly provides that the holder of
an instrument payable on demand, negotiated an unreasonable
length of time after its issue, shall not be regarded as a holder in
due course. In the absence of this express provision, such a
party would have been a holder in due course under the pre-
ceding section. It would seem, therefore, that when the statute
defines generally who shall be holders in due course and makes
an express exception of a particular class, who would otherwise
"Ex parte Goldberg & Lewis (1914) 67 So. (Ala.) 839.
'Liberty Trust Co. v. Tilton (1914) 217 Mass. 462.
'Brown v. Rowan (1915) 154 N. Y. S. io98.
'Vander Ploeg v. Van Zuuk (I9O7) 135 Ia. 350.
"St. Charles Sa. Bank v. Edwards (1912) 24 Mo. 553.
"Gresham Bank v. Watch (1915) 76 Or. 272.
'Bowles Co. v. Clark (igio) 59 Wash. 336.
"Art VI, sec. gi.
" The N. I. L., Art. VI, sec. 92, provides that: "where an instrument
payable on demand is negotiated an unreasonable length of time after its
issue, the holder is not deemed a holder in due course."
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be embraced, the exception negatives the idea that any other
class was to be excluded, in accordance with the maxim,
Expressio unius est exclusio alterius.
The court distinguished the present case from those cases in
which the maker has given an instrument to a third party and
has authorized him to transfer title to the payee by delivery,
when certain conditions of which the payee has no notice are
fulfilled. 5 A payee who purchases a note under such circum-
stances admittedly comes within the protection afforded a holder
in due course. In the principal case, however, it was argued that
the maker never had any transactions with the party who
attempted to transfer the note and that the thief never claimed
to have the power to deliver the note to the payee, except as
agent for the maker in payment of stamps sold to the latter. It
was accordingly concluded that the check was never negotiated
and that the payee was not a purchaser of the check, nor a
remote party, either to the instrument or to the transaction; but,
on the contrary, his claim of title to the instrument rested upon
a transfer from one who, at best, appeared to have authority
to deliver it and make a valid contract only for a consideration
which the plaintiff has failed to perform.
In answer to the court's argument that the check was never
negotiated, it must be noted that section 6o of the N. I. L. states
that an instrument is negotiated when it is transferred from one
person to another in such manner as to constitute the transferee
the holder thereof.1 6 A holder is defined as the payee or indorsee
of a bill or note who is in possession of it or the bearer thereof.17
It can hardly be maintained that the concluding sentence of sec-
tion 6o, viz., "If payable to bearer it is negotiated by delivery;
if payable to order it is negotiated by the indorsement of the
holder completed by delivery," was intended.to include all the
modes in which an instrument might be negotiated, or to restrict
the comprehensive terms of the preceding sentence. If that
" Cf. Boston Steel & Iron Co. v. Steuer (1903) 183 Mass. i4o; Liberty
Trust Co. v. Tilton, supra; Vander Ploeg v. Van Zuuk, supra.
" The N. I. L., Art. V, sec. 60, says: "An instrument is negotiated when
it is transferred from one person to another in such manner as to con-
stitute the transferee the holder thereof; if payable to order it is
negotiated by the indorsement of the holder completed by delivery."
'The N. I. L., Art. I, sec. 2, defines a holder as: "'Holder' means the
payee or indorsee of a bill or note, who is in possession of it, or the
bearer thereof."
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inference be attached to this provision, it is clear that in neither
of the above cases can the payee be a holder in due course, which
is contrary to the doctrine apparently established in New York.
It is also clear that if the plaintiff can be brought within the
phrase, "holder in due course," it is of no consequence that the
drawer of the check received no consideration.
Adopting the court's assumption that, when the improper nego-
tiation is by an agent, the payee may be a holder in due course, it
would seem necessarily to follow that when the improper negotia-
tion is by a thief, representing himself to be an agent, the con-
clusion must be the same. Surely, the payee must be considered
as much "on notice" in the former case as in the latter. While
the two cases are clearly distinguishable in fact, yet the language
of the N. I. L. would seem to be sufficiently comprehensive to
include both.
S. F. D.
SERVICE BY PUBLICATION TO OBTAIN PERSONAL JURISDICTION
OVER A RESIDENT WHO CANNOT BE FOUND
The problem of acquiring such jurisdiction as will validate
a personal judgment against one who is a resident of the state
issuing process, but who is not to be found therein, is compli-
cated, in most decisions, by uncertainty of distinction as to
the restrictions upon such a proceeding. Although it was per-
haps true at common law that as a rule jurisdiction had to be
based on the fact that the person or the thing was within the
territory,' this requirement was not a necessary element of
our legal scheme and has been abrogated by statute in many
common-law jurisdictions. Even in an action in rem, where
service by publication is universally recognized as valid, the
jural relations of the absent owner are altered so far as his
connection with the res is concerned. The step from such an
adjudication to one which imposes a general liability or duty
on a person absent from the jurisdiction is but a matter of
degree and one which common-law tribunals have found them-
selves, under appropriate statutes, perfectly able to take. For
example, an English court has no difficulty, in a divorce suit
brought in England, in giving a judgment for money damages
1 Story, Conflict of Laws, sec. 539.
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against the co-respondent who is in, and a resident of, Scotland. 2
A New Zealand law allowing the court at discretion to proceed
to a personal judgment against an absentee, on a contract to
be performed in New Zealand, is considered quite in harmony
with fundamental principles of justice.3 Under these statutes
service is usually had by the giving of actual notice outside the
jurisdiction, rather than by publication within the jurisdiction.
In our own country, before the War Amendments to the Con-
stitution, many cases recognized the power to give such a judg-
ment, binding in the state where it was rendered even though
denied validity abroad.4 These decisions involved both defend-
ants who were residents or citizens of the state rendering the
judgment and defendants who resided in other states or countries.
It would seem, then, that aside from express constitutional
restrictions, or those assumed to be implied from the nature of our
government, there is no lack of power in a state court to render
a personal judgment, valid within the state, against a defendant-
be he resident, citizen or neither-who was not, at the time of
trial, personally served within the jurisdiction. In so far as the
dicta of Pennoyer v'. Neff,s the explicit rulings in a few decisions
such as De La Montanya v. De La Montanya,8 and an occasional
author seek to propound some natural law which would, aside
from constitutional limitations, prevent such a judgment from
being binding within the state, they cannot be sustained.
It is undeniably true, on the other hand, that since the enact-
ment of the Fourteenth Amendment want of due process has
to a certain extent invalidated personal judgments not based on
personal service within the state. It is well settled that if the
absent defendant is not domiciled within the state, no such judg-
2 Rayment v. Rayment & Stuart; Chapman v. Chapman & Buist[I9IO] P. 271.
'Asbury v. Ellis [1893] A. C. 339.
'Thompson v. Emmert (1846) 4 McLean, 96; Kane v. Cook (1857) 8
Cal. 449; Middlesex Bank v. Butman (1848) 29 Me. ig; Phelps v.
Brewer (1852) 9 Cush. (Mass.) 390; Woodward v. Tremere (1828) 6
Pick. (Mass.) 354; Bigger v. Hutchings (183o) 2 Stew. (Ala.) 445;
Downer v. Shaw (185i) 22 N. H. 277; Davidson v. Sharpe (1845) 28
N. C. 14; Price v. Hickok 39 Vt. 292; Butterworth v. Kinsey (1855)
14 Tex. 5oo; contra, Barkman v. Hopkins (185o) ii Ark. 157; Dearing
'v. Bank of Charleston (1848) 5 Ga. 497.
(1877) 95 U. S. 714, 733.
(1896) 112 Cal. ]ox, x1o.
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ment can be given after service by publication merely, inasmuch
as sufficient notice and a reasonable opportunity to be heard, have
supposedly not been given. The decision will not be binding
even in the state where it is given,7 and may be attacked on the
same ground as a denial of due process of law at home or abroad.8
Whether this interpretation of due process is to be viewed merely
as the crystallization of a rule assumed by some courts to be
impliedly inherent in our constitutional structure, or as a distinct
addition thereto, is now relatively unimportant. The fact that
Pennoyer v. Neff, though decided in 1877, passes upon an Oregon
judgment rendered in 1866, two years before the Fourteenth
Amendment was proclaimed to be in force, would tend to indi-
cate that the former is the true position.9 It is not the purpose
here to discuss the wisdom of such a rule as regards non-citi-
zens, but, assuming it, to determine whether its extension to the
case of residents or citizens temporarily absent, is warranted.
The field is somewhat further narrowed by the fairly prevalent
view that if the defendant resident can be found within the state
to be personally served, nothing else will constitute due process.10
From the standpoint of a court so deciding, it may be argued
that it is somewhat difficult to understand how service by publi-
cation becomes sufficient to satisfy the requirement merely
because the defendant is not within the jurisdiction. The argu-
ment based upon lack of notice and reasonable opportunity to be
'Griffith v. Milwaukee Harvester Co. (1894) 92 Ia. 634; Lanning v.
Twining (igo6) 71 N. J. Eq. 573; Winfree v. Bagley (1889) 1O2 N. C.
515; Farmers, etc., Bank v. Carter (1889) 88 Tenn. 279; Thurston v.
Thurston (1894) 58 Minn. 279; Arnold v. Kahn (1885) 67 Cal. 472;
Denny v. Ashley (1888) 12 Col. 165; Cloyd v. Trotter (I886) 118 Ill. 391.
'Pennoyer v. Neff, supra; Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Nash (1897) 118
Ala. 477; Anderson v. Goff (1887) 72 Cal. 65; Marten v. Kittredge
(1887) 144 Mass. 13; McKinney v. Collins (1882) 88 N. Y. 217.
'It should be noted that the decision in Pennoyer v. Neff, on the facts
of the case, determines merely that the Circuit Court of the United
States was not bound to recognize the validity of the Oregon proceedings.
Whether the courts of Oregon itself were bound by the Constitution
to treat the judgment and proceedings under it as void was not involved,
although, of course, the opinion discusses the question.
"°Arnold v. Boggs (IgI5) 129 Minn. 270; McNamara v. Casserly
(1895) 61 Minn. 335; Bardwell v. Collins (i8go) 44 Minn. 97; Hockaday
v. Jones (1899) 8 Old. 156; Friedman v. First Nat. Bank of Cleveland
(1913) I35 Pac. (Old.) io69; Insurance Co. v. Robbins (1897) 53 Neb.
44; Bixby v. Bailey (1873) 11 Kan. 359; Brown v. Woody (1877) 64
Mo. 547.
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heard, however, does not apply to service by actual notice given
to the defendant outside the jurisdiction, as in the English cases
cited above. Here the only question is whether to expect the
defendant to defend the suit is, under the circumstances, so
arbitrary and unreasonable as not to be due process of law.
Again, approaching the problem with our first assumption in
mind, is there sufficient difference in the status of an absent
resident, or citizen even, from that of a non-resident, so that the
former must be held reasonably to contemplate the rendition of
personal judgments against him without actual notice, while
the latter need not? Geographically the resident may be as far
removed as the non-resident. If the incidents of domicile or
citizenship are sufficient to direct his attention so that publication
will be due notice, why is it not all the more true when he is
again within his home state? The courts which deny that
jurisdiction over the absent resident may be obtained by publi-
cation are perhaps the more consistent,1' although it may fairly
be said, on the other hand, that due process means the doing of
what is reasonable under the circumstances, and that personal
service is required where it may easily be had, as where the
defendant can be found in the state. For the reason last stated,
a substantial number of states will recognize as binding a per-
sonal judgment based on service by publication or service without
the state, whether the defendant resident who cannot be found
is in fact within the state12 or outside.a To such courts the
actual location of the defendant need cause no concern. That
the man sought was known to be within the state borders was
for this reason apparently not a necessary factor in the recent
case of Roberts v. Roberts, which decided for Minnesota for the
'Pinney v. Providence Loan and Investment Co. (igoo) io6 Wis. 396
(semble) ; De La Montanya v. De La Montanya, supra; Raher v. Raher
(i911) 129 N. W. (Ia.) 49.4; Bernhardt v. Brown (1896) 118 N. C. 7oo.
Cf. Bickerdike v. Allen (i895) 157 Ill. 95 (scire facias to revive a judg-
ment; publication void, though service by mailing held equivalent to
personal service).
'Betancourt v. Eberlin (1882) 71 Ala. 461; Harryman v. Roberts
(i879),52 Md. 65; Northcraft v. Oliver (1889) 74 Tex. 162.
'Harnill v. Talbott (1897) 72 Mo. App. 27; (1899) 81 Mo. App. 21o;
Hervey v. Hervey (1897) 56 N. J. Eq. x66; Fernandez v. Casey &
Swazey (189o) 77 Tex. 452; Henderson v. Staniford (i87o) IO5 Mass.
504; Martin v. Burns, Walker & Co. (i8gi) 8o Tex. 676.
" (1917) 161 N. W. (Minn.) 148.
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first time the validity of a personal judgment when against a
resident of the state where service was had by publication for the
reason that the defendant could not be found, although known
to be within the state. It might prove a turning point with
courts which deny the availability of publication against residents
absent from the state. Certainly the effectiveness of such notice
would in all probability be greater against one within the state.
In general, however, such courts have broadly repudiated the
entire validity of the type statute 5 providing for service by
publication where the resident defendant cannot be found.
C.B.
THE ADAMSON ACT
In the recent test case before the Supreme Court of the United
States1 the constitutionality of the Adamson Eight Hour Service
Act was upheld by a vote of five to four. In a vigorous opinion
Chief Justice White held the act to be within the powers of Con-
gress under its authority to regulate interstate commerce.
It is important to note that at the outset the Chief Justice
conceded that the act prescribed a minimum rate of wages and
that the right to fix a standard of wages is primarily private and,
as, such, guaranteed against invasion by Congress. Thus it
became necessary to justify the exercise of power primarily on
the authority vested in Congress to regulate interstate commerce
and, secondarily, on the policy of the government that the public
interests of society in the continued operation and promotion of
interstate transportation subjects those engaged therein to a
public power of regulation.2  The court held that the power to
regulate interstate commerce fundamentally included the power
to preserve an uninterrupted flow through its channels and to
guard against cessation threatened by the failure of carriers and
employees to agree upon the terms of a contract of employment.
(1913) Minn. Gen. Sts., sec. 7738.
'Wilson v. New and Ferris, Receivers (March 39, 1917) U. S. Sup. Ct,
Oct Term, 1916, No. 797. This article is merely a statement of the
substance of the decision.
'In Munn v. Illinois (1877) 94 U. S. 113, the court held: "When, there-
fore, one devotes his property to a use in which the public has an
interest, he, in effect, grants to the public an interest in that use and
must submit to be controlled by the public for the common good, to the
extent of the interest he has thus created."
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The power to prescribe rates,3 to regulate the relation between
carriers and employees, 4 to limit the right of contract among
carriers and with the public in the protection of public interest,"
and to compel the carrier to provide efficient service
6 had been
frequently sustained, and the power to provide by appropriate
legislation for the continuance of interstate commerce follows in
logical sequence. The Chief Justice disposes of the contention,
based on the case of Ex parte Milligan,7 that a public emergency
cannot give rise to powers which otherwise do not exist, by
saying that, though this be true, a public emergency might fur-
nish the occasion for an exercise by Congress of powers which
were.in existence. Indeed, it was essential that such a situation
should exist, or there would have been no necessity to limit
private rights of contract.8  Spealing of the private right of the
parties to fix the terms on which they should contract, the court
said:
"The capacity to exercise the private right free from
legislative interference affords no ground for saying that
legislative power does not exist to protect the public inter-
est from the injury resulting from the failure to exercise
the private right."
Chicago, Burlington & Quincy R. R. Co. v. Iowa (1877) 94 U. S. 155,
161; Stone v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co. (1886) 116 U. S. 307; Inter-
state Commerce Commission v. Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific R. R. Co.
(igio) 218 U. S. 88; Minnesota Rate Cases (1913) 230 U. S. 352.
'Employers' Liability Cases (19o8) 207 U. S. 463; Baltimore & Ohio
R. R. Co. v. Interstate Commerce Commission (1911) 221 U. S. 612;
Southern Ry. Co. v. U. S. (igii) 2= U. S. 2o; Mondoa v. New York,
New Haven & Hartford R. R. Co. (1912) 223 U. S. i.
'New York, New Haven & Hartford R. R. Co. v. Interstate Commerce
Commission (19o6) 2.00 U. S. 361; Atlantic Coast Line v. Riverside Mills
(191o) 219 U. S. 136; Texas & Pacific Ry. Co. v. Abilene Cotton Oil Co.
(9o7) 204 U. S. 426; Adams Express Co. v. Croninger (1913) 226 U. S.
491; Boston & Maine R. R. Co. v. Hooker (1912) 223 U. S. 97.
"Atlantic Coast Line v. North Carolina Corporation Commission (1907)
206 U. S. I, 26; Missouri Pacific Ry. v. Kansas (IgIo) 216 U. S. 262, 278.
7 (1866) 4 Wall. 2.
'To quote from the opinion: "If it be conceded that the power to
enact the statute was in effect the exercise of the right to fix wages
where by reason of the dispute there had been a failure to fix by agree-
ment, it would simply serve to show the nature and character of the
regulation essential to protect the public right and safeguard the move-
ment of interstate commerce, not involving any denial of the authority
to adopt it."
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Passing to the contention of the railroad companies that the
act was in violation of the Fifth Amendment, the court held that
the exemption of certain short lines and of certain classes of
employees from its operation did not destroy its equality, and that
there was adequate basis for classification. With reference to the
claim that, because of the hasty, thoughtless and improvident
manner in which the act was patsed and the wanton disregard
of the rights of the carriers, the statute lacked that due process
of law contemplated in the Fifth Amendment, the court said
that the facts leading up to the legislation, the controversybetween employers and employees, the interposition of the Pres-
ident, the public nature of the dispute and the call upon Con-
gress all demonstrated that action was taken after ample consider-
ation. The court also expressed the view that the fact that thedemands of the employees were in important respects limited
shows that an arbitrary concession to their demands was not
made.
It remains to state briefly the basic grounds of the dissenting
opinions of Mr. Justice Pitney and Mr. Justice Day. The formerdissented on the fundamental contention that the act bore no
relation to interstate commerce. It will be observed that his
argument is practically an embodiment of the opinion of theCourt in Adair v. United States,9 and proceeds on the theory
that the power of Congress extends only to regulation of the
use of the property devoted to interstate commerce and not to the
property itself or to the purely internal control of that property.
Mr. Justice Pitney also agreed with the dissenting opinion of Mr.
Justice Day. The latter was based on the due process clause of
the Fifth Amendment. The learned Justice claimed that this
amendment was violated both because the act involved an arbi-
trary bestowal by Congress without previous investigation or
consideration of millions of dollars belonging to the carriers upon
the employees by way of experiment and because provision was
not made for remuneration if the experiment proved a failure.
Mr. Justice Day concurred in that portion of the opinion of the
9 (i9o8) 208 U. S. 161. In this case the court held that it was not
competent for Congress to enact that no railroad engaged in interstate
commerce should discharge an employee solely because of his affiliation
with a labor union, for the reason that membership in a labor union bears
no relation to interstate commerce. The act was passed through fear of
a possible uprising by union members.
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court which recognized the general power of Congress over the
subject.
Mr. Justice McReynolds, who dissented from the opinion of
the court in a short statement, concluded by saying that, consider-
ing the doctrine adopted by the majority of the court as estab-
lished, it folloivs, as of course, that Congress has power to fix a
maximum as well as a minimum wage, to require compulsory
arbitration of labor disputes, and to take measures effectively to
protect the free flow of such commerce against any combination,
whether of operatives, owners or strangers. C. B. J.
